§ 425.16.California Anti-Slapp Law

Section 425.16 is California's anti-SLAPP statute — a special motion to strike aimed at lawsuits filed to punish or chill someone for speaking out or petitioning the government on a public issue. Subdivision (a) states the Legislature's finding directly: there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech and petition rights, and the statute is to be construed broadly to stop that.

The statute runs on a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must show the claim arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Subdivision (e) defines that category broadly: statements made before a legislative, executive, judicial, or other official proceeding; statements made in connection with an issue under review by such a body; statements made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; and any other conduct in furtherance of petition or speech rights connected to a public issue or issue of public interest. Once the defendant clears that first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff for the second step: the plaintiff must establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, based on the pleadings and supporting or opposing affidavits, or the claim is stricken. A finding that the plaintiff met that burden is not admissible later in the case and does not shift any burden of proof going forward — the ruling settles only whether the motion is granted, not the merits.

Three features make this an unusually powerful early motion. First, filing the notice of motion automatically stays all discovery in the action until the ruling is final, unless the court allows specified discovery for good cause — so a defendant facing a SLAPP suit does not have to litigate expensive discovery before the motion is even decided. Second, subdivision (i) makes an order granting or denying the motion immediately appealable under § 904.1, giving either side a direct route to the Court of Appeal without waiting for final judgment. Third, the fee-shifting cuts both ways: subdivision (c)(1) entitles a prevailing defendant to attorney's fees and costs, while a plaintiff who defeats a motion the court finds frivolous or intended solely to cause delay recovers fees and costs under § 128.5. A narrow carve-out in subdivision (c)(2) denies fees to a prevailing defendant in certain public-records and open-meeting enforcement actions. Subdivision (d) exempts enforcement actions brought by a public prosecutor acting in that capacity, and subdivision (f) requires the motion to be filed within 60 days of service of the complaint, with a hearing set within 30 days of the motion's service absent docket constraints.

Because the statute defines “complaint” to include a cross-complaint and “defendant” to include a cross-defendant, anti-SLAPP motions reach cross-complaints too. Two closely related sections narrow or extend this framework: § 425.17 exempts specific categories of claims — public-interest enforcement actions and certain commercial speech — from the statute entirely, and § 425.18 creates a distinct “SLAPPback” cause of action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process arising from a prior SLAPP suit, applying a different and less favorable set of procedural rules to a special motion aimed at a SLAPPback claim itself.