2-1401.Relief from judgments.

Article II. Civil Practice · Part 14. Post-Judgment · Last amended 2025 · Last verified July 20, 2026

In one sentenceSection 2-1401 is the sole route for asking a court to vacate or change a final judgment more than 30 days after entry, replacing old writs with one petition procedure that also reaches a few specific sentencing grounds.

Full Text of 735 ILCS 5/2-1401

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(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the relief obtainable.

(b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the order or judgment was entered but is not a continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by an affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all parties in the original action in addition to the current record title holders of the property, current occupants, and any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the petition shall be notified as provided by rule.

(b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony; (2) the movant's participation in the offense was related to him or her previously having been a victim of domestic violence or gender-based violence; (3) there is substantial evidence of domestic violence or gender-based violence against the movant that was not presented at the movant's sentencing hearing; (4) (blank); and (5) the evidence of domestic violence or gender-based violence against the movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the sentencing hearing, or previous hearing under this Section filed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 103rd General Assembly, and is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original trial court. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant from applying for any other relief under this Section or any other law otherwise available to him or her. This subsection (b-5) applies to all eligible convictions, including, but not limited to, if the judge renders the sentence based on a negotiated plea agreement. Relief under this Section allows for the modification of the length of sentence without affecting the conviction.

As used in this subsection (b-5): "Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

"Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the term in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

"Gender-based violence" includes evidence of victimization as a trafficking victim, as defined by paragraph (10) of subsection (a) of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012, evidence of victimization under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, evidence of victimization under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, or evidence of victimization of any offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012, irrespective of criminal prosecution or conviction.

"Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse, persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common, or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship.

"Substantial evidence" means evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

(A) she was convicted of a forcible felony; (B) her participation in the offense was a direct result of her suffering from postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis; (C) no evidence of postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical person at trial or sentencing, or both; (D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present this defense due to suffering from postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and (E) evidence of postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis as suffered by the person is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original court. Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from applying for any other relief under this Article or any other law otherwise available to her. This subsection (b-10) applies to all eligible convictions, including, but not limited to, if the judge renders the sentence based on a negotiated plea agreement. Relief under this Section allows for the modification of the length of sentence without affecting the conviction. As used in this subsection (b-10): "Postpartum depression" means a mood disorder which strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders. "Postpartum psychosis" means an extreme form of postpartum depression which can occur during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions, auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia, hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania. (c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act and Section 2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, in a petition based upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-5) or (b-10) of this Section, or in a motion to vacate and expunge convictions under the Cannabis Control Act as provided by subsection (i) of Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act, the petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment. Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years.

(c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and institute proceedings under this Section if his or her final order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal immigration law.

(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not affect the order or judgment, or suspend its operation.

(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not affect the right, title, or interest in or to any real or personal property of any person, not a party to the original action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any right of any person not a party to the original action under any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment. When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is entitled to remain in possession of the property until the foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.

(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief.

End

Plain-English Summary

Once the 30-day window for a post-trial motion closes, this section becomes the only door left for attacking a final order or judgment. It abolishes writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review, and folds every ground for relief those old remedies once offered into a single petition procedure, regardless of the kind of case or proceeding that produced the judgment (with a narrow exception under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015).

The petition is filed in the same proceeding where the judgment was entered, though it isn't a continuation of that case. It must be backed by an affidavit or other showing of facts outside the record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure has to name additional parties, including current record title holders, current occupants, and anyone with a recorded interest in the property before the petition was filed.

Two narrow, unusual grounds sit inside this otherwise civil vacatur statute: a person convicted of a forcible felony can ask, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have the sentence -- not the conviction -- shortened, where the offense was tied to the person's own history as a victim of domestic or gender-based violence, or to postpartum depression or psychosis that wasn't presented at sentencing and would likely have changed the sentence imposed.

An ordinary petition under this Section generally must be filed within 2 years of the judgment, a period tolled for legal disability, duress, or fraudulent concealment of the grounds for relief. That 2-year clock does not bind petitions resting on Code of Criminal Procedure Section 116-3, the two sentencing grounds in (b-5) and (b-10), or Cannabis Control Act expungement motions -- subsection (c) excepts all of those from its own deadline, leaving them with no fixed filing window. Petitions attacking the immigration consequences of a guilty or nolo contendere plea face no deadline either. Filing a petition doesn't pause or affect the judgment, and the statute protects bona fide third parties who acquired property or a foreclosure-sale interest for value before the petition was filed -- while preserving, without any time limit, the separate right to attack a judgment that was void from the start.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Section 2-1401 the Illinois equivalent of a Rule 60(b) motion in federal court?

It serves a similar function -- the mechanism for relief from a final judgment once the 30-day post-trial window has closed -- consolidating older common-law remedies into one petition, though its text and structure differ from Federal Rule 60(b)'s list of enumerated grounds.

What is the deadline for filing a petition under Section 2-1401?

Subsection (c) sets a general 2-year deadline for petitions under this Section, tolled for legal disability, duress, or fraudulent concealment -- but that deadline does not apply to petitions resting on Code of Criminal Procedure Section 116-3, the domestic-violence, gender-based-violence, or postpartum grounds in (b-5) and (b-10), or Cannabis Control Act expungement motions, all of which subsection (c) excepts from its own 2-year window. Petitions attacking a void judgment, or the immigration consequences of a plea, also face no such deadline.

Does filing a Section 2-1401 petition stop the judgment from being enforced?

No, subsection (d) says the filing doesn't affect the order or judgment or suspend its operation.

Can this petition undo a criminal sentence?

Only in the narrow situations under subsections (b-5) and (b-10) -- it can shorten a sentence tied to domestic violence, gender-based violence, or postpartum depression or psychosis, and only the sentence, not the conviction.

Will vacating a judgment under this section undo a sale to an innocent buyer?

No, subsection (e) protects a non-party who acquired property or a foreclosure-sale interest for value before the petition was filed, and lets certain foreclosure purchasers in possession for more than six months stay put until the case is resolved.

Amendment History

(Source: P.A. 102-639, eff. 8-27-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 103-403, eff. 1-1-24; 103-968, eff. 1-1-25.)

Source & verification. Section text and amendment history are reproduced verbatim from the Illinois Compiled Statutes, published by the Illinois Compiled Statutes, Illinois General Assembly / Legislative Reference Bureau. Last verified July 20, 2026. · Official source

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