Rule 74.04.Summary Judgment.
Part I · Rule 74: Judgments, Orders and Proceedings Thereon · Last amended January 1, 2027 · Last verified July 22, 2026
This rule prints two full, separately-dated versions in the official compilation (a pending or recent amendment straddle); both are shown below.
Full Text of Rule 74.04
Amendment History
Effective until January 1, 2027
Adopted May 22, 1987, eff. Jan. 1, 1988. Amended June 1, 1993, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; Amended Sept. 28, 1993, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; Amended Feb. 27, 2002, eff. Jan. 1, 2003; Amended Dec. 18, 2007, eff. July 1, 2008.
Effective January 1, 2027
Adopted May 22, 1987, eff. Jan. 1, 1988. Amended June 1, 1993, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; Amended Sept. 28, 1993, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; Amended Feb. 27, 2002, eff. Jan. 1, 2003; Amended Dec. 18, 2007, eff. July 1, 2008; Amended June 2, 2026, eff. January 1, 2027.
Official Comment
Effective until January 1, 2027
This rule is the same as Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the amendments to paragraphs (c) and (e) recommended by the Federal Advisory Committee in 1955; and with the addition of paragraph (h) to make clear that the procedure is not applicable where there is a factual issue to be determined by the court or jury. The reasons for the amendments to paragraphs (c) and (e) are stated by the Federal Advisory Committee as follows: “Subdivision (c). The specific provision, made by the amendment, allowing summary judgment to be granted against the party who has moved therefore, is in accord with N.Y.C.P. Rule 113 and Wis.Stat. Sec. 270.635(3) (1951), as well as the urging of commentators. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 Tex.L.Rev. 285, 303 (1952); Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 567, 570-571 (1952); Comment, Summary Judgment, 25 Wash.L.Rev. 71, 76-77 (1950). It codifies a result already achieved by most federal courts. See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 56.12 (2d ed. 1953); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed.Prac. & Proc. § 1235 (1950) [See now, Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil]. “Subdivision (e). Some recent cases, particularly in the Third Circuit, have held that a mere allegation in the pleading is sufficient to create a genuine issue as to a material fact, and thus prevent summary judgment, even though the pleader has made no attempt to controvert affidavits and other evidentiary matter presented by his opponent; e. g., Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 8 F.R.D. 349 (D.N.J.1948), aff’d 176 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1949); Chappell v. Goltsman, 186 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1950); and cases cited in 6 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 56.11[3], n. 16 (2d ed. 1953). This line of cases is termed “patently erroneous” in Note, 99 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 212, 214-215 (1950), citing many contrary authorities. The purpose of Rule 56 is to pierce the formal allegations of the pleadings and reach immediately the merits of the controversy. If pleading allegations are sufficient to raise a genuine issue as against uncontradicted evidentiary matter, this remedy then becomes substantially without utility. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1943). The view of most cases and commentators is that, where the motion for summary judgment is supported by depositions or affidavits, the opposing party must make a similar presentation to show the existence of a genuine issue of fact, or suffer judgment to be entered. 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed.Prac. & Proc. § 1235 (1950) [See, now, Wright Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil]. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 56.11[??], n. 21 (2d ed. 1953), and cases there cited; id. at 56.15[??]; Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules—When An Issue of Fact Is Presented, 51 Mich.L.Rev. 1143, 1159-1165 (1953); Shientag, The Summary Judgment 24 (1941); Kennedy, The Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 13 Brooklyn L.Rev. 5 (1947); Comm., “Genuineness” of Issues on Summary Judgment, 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 940. “The amendment to subdivision (e) states this last principle and thus makes it clear that pleading allegations cannot, in themselves, create a genuine issue of material fact when summary judgment is sought. By emphasizing the function of the motion for summary judgment, the amendment may stimulate more frequent and effective use of this device, as urged by the Judicial Conference of the United States, in its Report of Sept.1948, pp. 36-37, and by commentators. Yankwich, Summary Judgment under Federal Practice, 40 Calif.L.Rev. 204 (1952); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand.L.Rev. 493, 502-505 (1950); Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 567 (1952); Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 909, 936-937 (1953); Comment, Summary Judgment, 25 Wash.L.Rev. 71 (1950); Note, The Scope of Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 607 (1952); Note, Summary Judgments in the Federal Courts, 99 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 212 (1950); see McAllister, Pre-Trial Practice in the Southern District of New York, 12 F.R.D. 373, 378. Compare the holding that summary judgment granting specific performance can never be proper, for a party cannot be entitled to equitable relief as a matter of law, Seaboard Surety Co. v. Racine Screw Co., 203 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1953), with the grant of summary judgment of specific performance in Dale v. Preg, 204 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1953), and Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 27 A.L.R.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1951), and as expressly authorized in N.Y.C.P. Rule 113. See also the grant of summary judgment of injunction in United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953), and Houghton, Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, 113 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1940). ‘The amended rule does not, of course, require the grant of summary judgment in a case where such judgment is not proper even though the facts be taken as in the moving party’s affidavit. “The court may deny the motion if for any reason summary judgment would be inappropriate, even though the opposite party has not submitted an affidavit. The court may order a continuance in accordance with the provisions of Rule 56(f) where a party makes a substantial showing by affidavit that he cannot then present the facts essential to justify his opposition to judgment.”
Effective January 1, 2027
This rule is the same as Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the amendments to paragraphs (c) and (e) recommended by the Federal Advisory Committee in 1955; and with the addition of paragraph (h) to make clear that the procedure is not applicable where there is a factual issue to be determined by the court or jury. The reasons for the amendments to paragraphs (c) and (e) are stated by the Federal Advisory Committee as follows: “Subdivision (c). The specific provision, made by the amendment, allowing summary judgment to be granted against the party who has moved therefore, is in accord with N.Y.C.P. Rule 113 and Wis.Stat. Sec. 270.635(3) (1951), as well as the urging of commentators. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 Tex.L.Rev. 285, 303 (1952); Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 567, 570-571 (1952); Comment, Summary Judgment, 25 Wash.L.Rev. 71, 76-77 (1950). It codifies a result already achieved by most federal courts. See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 56.12 (2d ed. 1953); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed.Prac. & Proc. § 1235 (1950) [See now, Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil]. “Subdivision (e). Some recent cases, particularly in the Third Circuit, have held that a mere allegation in the pleading is sufficient to create a genuine issue as to a material fact, and thus prevent summary judgment, even though the pleader has made no attempt to controvert affidavits and other evidentiary matter presented by his opponent; e. g., Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 8 F.R.D. 349 (D.N.J.1948), aff’d 176 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1949); Chappell v. Goltsman, 186 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1950); and cases cited in 6 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 56.11[3], n. 16 (2d ed. 1953). This line of cases is termed “patently erroneous” in Note, 99 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 212, 214-215 (1950), citing many contrary authorities. The purpose of Rule 56 is to pierce the formal allegations of the pleadings and reach immediately the merits of the controversy. If pleading allegations are sufficient to raise a genuine issue as against uncontradicted evidentiary matter, this remedy then becomes substantially without utility. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1943). The view of most cases and commentators is that, where the motion for summary judgment is supported by depositions or affidavits, the opposing party must make a similar presentation to show the existence of a genuine issue of fact, or suffer judgment to be entered. 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed.Prac. & Proc. § 1235 (1950) [See, now, Wright Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil]. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 56.11[??], n. 21 (2d ed. 1953), and cases there cited; id. at 56.15[??]; Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules—When An Issue of Fact Is Presented, 51 Mich.L.Rev. 1143, 1159-1165 (1953); Shientag, The Summary Judgment 24 (1941); Kennedy, The Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 13 Brooklyn L.Rev. 5 (1947); Comm., “Genuineness” of Issues on Summary Judgment, 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 940. “The amendment to subdivision (e) states this last principle and thus makes it clear that pleading allegations cannot, in themselves, create a genuine issue of material fact when summary judgment is sought. By emphasizing the function of the motion for summary judgment, the amendment may stimulate more frequent and effective use of this device, as urged by the Judicial Conference of the United States, in its Report of Sept.1948, pp. 36-37, and by commentators. Yankwich, Summary Judgment under Federal Practice, 40 Calif.L.Rev. 204 (1952); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand.L.Rev. 493, 502-505 (1950); Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 567 (1952); Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 909, 936-937 (1953); Comment, Summary Judgment, 25 Wash.L.Rev. 71 (1950); Note, The Scope of Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 607 (1952); Note, Summary Judgments in the Federal Courts, 99 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 212 (1950); see McAllister, Pre-Trial Practice in the Southern District of New York, 12 F.R.D. 373, 378. Compare the holding that summary judgment granting specific performance can never be proper, for a party cannot be entitled to equitable relief as a matter of law, Seaboard Surety Co. v. Racine Screw Co., 203 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1953), with the grant of summary judgment of specific performance in Dale v. Preg, 204 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1953), and Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 27 A.L.R.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1951), and as expressly authorized in N.Y.C.P. Rule 113. See also the grant of summary judgment of injunction in United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953), and Houghton, Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, 113 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1940). ‘The amended rule does not, of course, require the grant of summary judgment in a case where such judgment is not proper even though the facts be taken as in the moving party’s affidavit. “The court may deny the motion if for any reason summary judgment would be inappropriate, even though the opposite party has not submitted an affidavit. The court may order a continuance in accordance with the provisions of Rule 56(f) where a party makes a substantial showing by affidavit that he cannot then present the facts essential to justify his opposition to judgment.”
Plain-English Summary
Summary judgment lets a court resolve a claim — or part of one — without a trial, when the paper record already shows there is nothing left for a judge or jury to decide. Rule 74.04 is Missouri’s version of this tool, and it is one of the most heavily used rules in civil litigation because it can end a case, or narrow it dramatically, long before trial.
Either side can move for summary judgment. A claimant can move after thirty days from filing the case, or sooner if the other side has already moved for summary judgment. A defending party can move at any time. What makes Missouri’s rule distinctive is subsection (c)’s numbered-paragraph mechanism. The movant must attach a statement of uncontroverted material facts, with each fact in its own numbered paragraph and a citation to the record supporting it. The opposing party must respond paragraph by paragraph, admitting or denying each one, and any denial must point to specific record evidence — a bare denial or a reference back to the pleadings is not enough. Fail to respond properly to a numbered paragraph, and that fact is deemed admitted. The rule then allows a reply, and even a sur-reply, if either side introduces additional numbered facts, keeping the fact record tightly organized right up until the court rules.
Under the rule’s own language, the court grants summary judgment when the papers on file — motion, response, reply, and any sur-reply — show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judgment can be partial: a court may resolve liability alone even while damages remain in dispute. If the case is not fully resolved, subsection (d) directs the court to specify which facts are established without controversy so the eventual trial can proceed on a narrower footing.
This rule appears in two versions straddling a January 1, 2027 amendment. The change is narrow: it drops outdated references to specific electronic media and word-processing formats (older language mentioned diskettes and named particular software) and now requires only an electronic copy in a format readable by commonly used word-processing programs. It does not touch the summary judgment standard, the numbered-paragraph mechanism, or any deadline. Everything about how a Missouri Summary Judgment (MSJ) motion is briefed and decided carries forward unchanged.
Frequently Asked Questions
How soon can a claimant file a summary judgment motion?
A claimant seeking to recover on a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, or seeking a declaratory judgment, may move for summary judgment any time after thirty days from when the action was filed, or earlier if the adverse party has already served its own summary judgment motion.
Can a defending party move for summary judgment at any point in the case?
Yes. A party defending against a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or declaratory judgment request may move for summary judgment at any time, with or without supporting affidavits.
What has to be in the statement of uncontroverted material facts?
Each fact the movant claims is undisputed must appear in its own separately numbered paragraph, with specific references to the pleadings, discovery, exhibits, or affidavits that support it. Copies of the cited discovery, exhibits, or affidavits must be attached.
How long does the opposing party have to respond to a summary judgment motion?
Thirty days after the motion is served. The response must track each of the movant’s numbered paragraphs and admit or deny it directly.
What happens if I don't respond properly to a numbered fact paragraph?
A response that fails to comply with the rule as to any numbered paragraph is treated as an admission of the truth of that paragraph. A bare denial without specific record citations does not satisfy the rule.
What does “genuine issue of material fact” require under the rule's text?
The rule directs the court to grant summary judgment when the motion, response, reply, and any sur-reply together show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A denial cannot rest on the pleadings alone — it needs specific record references showing a genuine dispute exists.
Can the movant file a reply, and is there a deadline?
Yes. The movant may file a reply memorandum within fifteen days after the response is served, and must use that same window to admit or deny any additional disputed facts the response raised.
Is summary judgment available on liability alone, leaving damages for trial?
Yes. The rule expressly allows an interlocutory summary judgment on any issue, including liability alone, even while a genuine dispute over the amount of damages remains.