Rule 1-054.1.Judgments and orders; time limit
Last amended August 21, 2006 · Last verified June 26, 2026
Full Text of Rule 1-054.1
Rule History
[Approved, effective December 15, 1999; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 06-8300-017, effective August 21, 2006.]
Committee Commentary
The chief judge of a judicial district has the power and responsibility to monitor performance of the judges of the judicial district, including compliance with the sixty (60) day time limit for entry of judgments and orders. See Rule 23-109(B)(17) NMRA. A separate procedure for monitoring compliance, as found in former Rule 1-054(B), is unnecessary.
Committee commentary for 2006 amendment. — The 2006 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 06-8300-017, effective August 21, 2006, supersedes the portion of Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 providing that many post-judgment motions are deemed automatically denied if not granted within thirty (30) days of filing. As a result of this change, and changes made to Paragraph D of Rule 1-052 and Paragraph D of Rule 1-059, post-judgment motions are subject to the rule that the court shall enter judgments or orders within sixty (60) days of submission. Rule 1-054.1 NMRA. Because there no longer is an automatic denial of post-judgment motions, the time for filing notices of appeal will run "from the entry of an order expressly disposing of the motion". Rule 12-201(D) NMRA (time for filing of notice of appeal runs from date of entry of order expressly disposing of the motion when there is no provision of automatic denial of motion under applicable statute or rule of court).
In 1917, the Legislature provided that the trial court shall have control over its judgments for thirty (30) days after entry. Laws 1917, ch. 15. The statute also provided that if the court did not rule upon timely post-judgment motions within thirty (30) days after filing, the motions were deemed to be denied by operation of law. Id. That provision, now contained in Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978, is superseded by the 2006 amendment.
The scope of Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 has never been clear. The statute applies only to non-jury trials, Valley Bank of Commerce v. Hilburn, 2005-NMCA-004, ¶ 18, 136 N.M. 741, 105 P.3d 294, and the automatic denial portion has been construed to not apply to post-judgment motions made pursuant to Rule 1-060 NMRA. Wooley v. Wooley, 75 N.M. 241, 245, 403 P.2d 685, 687-688 (1965). The automatic denial provision has caused confusion, e.g., Archuleta v. New Mexico State Police, 108 N.M. 543, 775 P.2d 745 (1989) and, on occasion, possible injustice. E.g., Beneficial Finance Corp. v. Bradley, 120 N.M. 228, 900 P.2d 977 (1995) (though Rule 1-059(E) NMRA is silent as to automatic denial while Paragraph D of Rule 1-059 NMRA explicitly provides for automatic denial, Rule 1-059(E) motions for reconsideration are automatically denied after thirty (30) days. As a result, appeal was untimely when notice of appeal was filed shortly after court's order denying motion but more than thirty days from date of automatic denial of motion).
Perhaps to alert litigants to the perils of the automatic denial statutory provision, the Supreme Court incorporated a thirty-day automatic denial provision in Rules 1-052(D) (motion to amend findings and conclusions), Paragraph D of Rule 1-059 NMRA (motion for new trial) and a former version of Rule 1-050 NMRA (motion for directed verdict), but omitted the provision in the Court's 1999 amendment to Rule 1-050. Valley Bank of Commerce v. Hilburn, 2005-NMCA-004, ¶ 15, 136 N.M. 741, 105 P.3d 294. The presence of the automatic denial provision in Paragraph D of Rule 1-059 but not in Paragraph C of Rule 1-050 NMRA has created an apparent anomaly in that a Rule 1-059 motion for new trial is deemed denied after thirty (30) days while the often simultaneously-filed Rule 1-050 motion for a judgment as a matter of law is not. Id. at ¶ 16.
The 2006 amendment to Rule 1-054.1 NMRA and the corresponding amendments to Paragraph D of Rule 1-052 and Paragraph D of Rule 1-059 NMRA eliminate the confusion by providing that the automatic denial provision in Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 has no application in cases to which the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts apply.
The Supreme Court can supersede the automatic denial provision in Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 by promulgating a rule of procedure to the contrary. Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 5, 138 N.M. 398, 120 P.3d 820 ("We have exercised our superintending control under Article VI, Section 3, to revoke or amend a statutory provision when the statutory provision conflicts with an existing court rule . . . or if the provision impairs the essential function of the court."). This superseding power may not extend to legislative provisions properly limiting a court's jurisdiction. See Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 339, 805 P.2d 603, 606 (1991) ("If the statutory provision were intended by the legislature to have jurisdictional effect, then presumably we would accord it that effect -- unless we were to hold it unconstitutional...."). The automatic denial portion of Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978, however, does not purport to affect the jurisdiction of the district court. It is similar to another statute providing for automatic denial of certain orders based on the passage of time, about which the Supreme Court declared "there are good reasons for construing it simply as the legislative adoption of a housekeeping rule to assist the courts with the management of their cases, to have effect unless and until waived by a court in a particular case or modified by a rule of this Court on the same subject." Id. at 339, 111 N.M. at 339. Even if Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 did purport to limit the jurisdiction of the district court, the statute probably would be unconstitutional. See In re Arnall, 94 N.M. 306, 610 P.2d 193 (1980) (constitutional provision granting district courts general jurisdiction precludes legislative attempts to limit jurisdiction of district courts).
These amendments to Rules 1-052, 1-059 and 1-054.1 affect only the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts. Rules applicable to other courts that provide for automatic denial of motions by the passage of time are unaffected by this amendment. See, e.g., Paragraph C of Rule 5-614 NMRA (motion for new trial, 30 days); Paragraph B of Rule 5-801 NMRA (motion to modify sentence, 90 days); Paragraph H of Rule 5-802 NMRA (habeas corpus, petition for certiorari, 30 days); Paragraph B of Rule 7-611 NMRA (motion for new trial, 20 days); Paragraph A of Rule 10-120 NMRA (relief from judgment or order, 10 or 30 days); Rule 10-230.1 NMRA (modification of judgment, 90 days); Paragraph C of Rule 12-404 NMRA (motions for rehearing, 20 days unless the court orders otherwise); Paragraph E of Rule 12-501 NMRA (petition for certiorari after habeas corpus petition, 30 days unless otherwise ordered by court). The appropriate rules committees may consider whether to review whether similar amendments should be made to these rules.
Plain-English Summary
This short rule puts a deadline on decisions. Notwithstanding Section 39-1-1, the court must enter a judgment or order within sixty days after submission, which the rule defines as the time the court takes the matter under advisement.
As the committee commentary explains, the 2006 amendment superseded the statutory provision that deemed many post-judgment motions automatically denied if not ruled on within thirty days; instead, those motions now fall under this sixty-day decision rule, and the time to appeal runs from the order that expressly disposes of the motion.
Frequently Asked Questions
How long does a New Mexico court have to rule after a matter is submitted?
Sixty days after submission—the point at which the court takes the matter under advisement.
Are post-judgment motions still automatically denied after thirty days?
No. The 2006 amendment superseded that statutory automatic-denial provision; post-judgment motions are now subject to the sixty-day decision rule, and the appeal clock runs from the order expressly disposing of the motion.